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An introduction

The National Debate and State Level Response:
The New Indiana Juvenile Code
DAN HOPSON*

The spring 1968 issue of the Indiana Law Journal was devoted to a

symposium on the then recent United States Supreme Court decision, In

re Gault.2 Several scholars 3 and juvenile justice functionaries4 analyzed

the probable impact of Gault on the historic role of the juvenile court, the
official actors in the juvenile justice system and the parents and children
whom the courts serve. A law student examined the existing Indiana
Juvenile Code5 and concluded that a "comprehensive program" of
legislative reform was necessary if "the legislature would... meet the
Supreme Court's challenge in Gault to give the juvenile fair treatment in'6
actuality, consistent with the State's espousal of concern for children."
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court7 and the various
states' supreme courts," embarked on a program of constitutional
*LL.B. 1953 Kansas; LL.M. 1954 Yale. Director, Center for the Study of Legal Policy
Relating to Children; Professor of Law, Indiana University.
'Symposium on Juvenile Problems: In re Gault, 43 IND. L.J. 523 (1968).
2387 U.S. 1 (1967).
3Paulsen, Juvenile Courts and the Legacy of '67, 43 IND. L.J. 527 (1968); Skoller, The
Right to Counsel and the Role of Counsel in Juvenile Court Proceedings,43 IND. L.J. 558
(1968); Schornhorst, The Waiver ofJuvenile CourtJursdiction. Kent Revisted, 43 IND. L.J.
583 (1968); Cohen, An Evaluation of Gault by a Sociologist 43 IND. L.J. 614 (1968); Platt,
Schecter & Tiffany, In Defense of Youth: A Case Study of the Public Defender in Juvenile
Court 43 IND. L.J. 619 (1968).
4Reed, Gault and the Juvenile Training Schoo4 43 IND. L.J. 641 (1968); Sheridan, The
Gault Decisionand ProbationServices, 43 IND. L.J. 655 (1968).
5Note, Extending ConstitutionalRights to Juveniles-Gaultin Indiana,43 IND. L.J. 661
(1968).
6Id. at 676.
7Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204 (1978); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
"As compared to pre-Gaultdays, the number of appeals in juvenile cases is staggering.
Compare West Key numbers Infants 68, Infants 12, Court 100 and Constitutional Law
255(4) in 1965 with the number of cases cited under the same key numbers in 1972 and
1978. The JUVENILE LAW DIGEST. published monthly by the National Council of Juvenile
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development of procedural due process and statutory interpretation of
existing parens patriae informal state juvenile codes. Law journals
responded with an ever increasing volume of symposia, articles, and student notes.' But Gault's major impact was on nationally organized task
forces and standard setting groups 0 and on state legislatures
themselves."1
Initially, the effort by these groups was primarily aimed at procedural
reforms,12 but with the rise of both the children's liberation movement 3
and the fear of children generated by the increase in violent juvenile
behavior, 14 reform groups and, to an increasing extent, state legislatures
reexamined the basic premises of the juvenile justice system-that
troubled children, whether labeled neglected, status-delinquent (PINS),
or crime-delinquent, were entitled to have delivered to them

and Family Courts Judges, reflects the increasing numbers and wide variety of appellate
court cases in this area.
'Five symposia which cite most of the earlier articles and notes have been recently
published: 57 B.U.L.J. 617 (1977); 24 GONZ. L. REv. 289 (1979); 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1015
(1977); 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 239 (1979); 5 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 633 (1978). Compare the entries in
the INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICALS under the headnotes Juvenile Courts and Juvenile Delinquency in the September, 1967 - August, 1970 volume with the entires in the more recent
September, 1973 - August, 1976 volume.
"0H.E.W. OFFICE OF YOUTH DEVELOPMENT. MODEL ACT FOR FAMILY COURTS AND STATELOCAL CHILDREN'S PROGRAM (1975) [hereinafter cited as MODEL ACT. NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS. JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION (1976); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION. REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE ADMINISTRATOR
ON STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: SEPTEMBER 30, 1976 (1976);

NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY. MODEL RULES FOR JUVENILE COURTS

(1969) [hereinafter cited as

MODEL RULES];

UNIFORM

LAW COMMISSIONERS.

UNIFORM

JUVENILE COURT ACT (1968) [hereinafter cited as UNIFORM ACT]; WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (1970). See also, IJA-ABA, JUVENILE
JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT (Tent. Draft 1977) [hereinafter cited as IJA-ABA STANDARDS.

with reference made to the individual volume of the 23 volumes and separate summary and
analysis volume produced by the PROJECT]; THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELIN-

QUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME (1967) (researched and written prior to Gault)[hereinafter cited
as TASK FORCE ON YOUTH CRIME].

"During the 12 years since the Gault decision, nearly every state has enacted major revisions of its juvenile code. For a compilation of state juvenile court laws, see J. HUTZLER &
R. SESTAK, JUVENILE COURT JURISDICTION OVER CHILDREN'S CONDUCT (1977); N. LEVIN & R.
SARRI, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (1974). Recent major re-evaluations of the juvenile justice
system have occurred in California, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 200 (West 1978); Colorado,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-103 (Supp. 1978); Florida, FLA. STAT. § 39.01 (Supp. 1978); Kansas,

ch. 158, §§ 1-37, 1978 Kan. Sess. Laws 684; New York, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. § 711
(McKinney's Supp. 1978); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE tit. 13 (Supp. 1979).
"See UNIFORM ACT and MODEL RULES. supra note 10.
Sp. MURPHY. OUR KINDLY PARENTS-THE STATE (1974); A. PLATT. THE CHILD SAVERS

(1969); E.

SCHUR. RADICAL NONINTERVENTION

(1973); Fox, Juvenile JusticeReformed-- An

HistoricalPerspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970); Rendleman, Parens Patria:From
Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C.L. REV. 205, 239-40, 255-59 (1971).
"Serious Youth Crime Hearings before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1978); L. EMPREY.
AMERICAN DELINQUENCY: ITS MEANING AND CONSTRUCTION (1978); D. HAMPARIAN. R.
SCHUSTER. S. DINITZ & J. CONRAD. THE VIOLENT FEW (1978).
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rehabilitative, care and protective services on an individualized basis.1 5
From those who feared children came the call for the categorization of
children based on the nature of the crime, 16 legislative or prosecutorial
discretion to start certain children in the adult system17 and, in the highly
publicized effort by the IJA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards Project,
allowing, within the juvenile system itself, determinate sentences based
upon the nature of the child's behavior. 18
On the other hand, those who felt that the juvenile justice system's intrusion into family life and more particularly into the life of children had
been counterproductive-because the system lacked either the ability or
the desire to effectively rehabilitate children-argued that the state
should decrease its coercive responsibility to neglected and status offense children. 19 Initially, and even before Gault, the first effort was to
relabel status offense children by creating new labels: PINS (persons in
need of supervision); CHINS (children in need of supervision); and similar
labels.

20

Subsequently, diversion, deinstitutionalization and the non-

mixing of crime and status-delinquent children were passionately advocated. 21 More recently, the call22 has been to remove "non-crime"
children from the system entirely.

"THE CHILD. THE CLINIC AND THE COURT (J. Addams ed. 1925); H. Lou. JUVENILE COURTS
IN THE UNITED STATES (1927). Recent re-affirmations of the basic philosphy include: Arthur, Status Offenders need a Court of Last Resort, 57 B.U.L.J. 631 (1977); Penna, Introduction: The Role of the Juvenile Court-Socialor Legal Institutions?5 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. 633 (1978); Dembitz, Book Review, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1934 (1978)(reviewing the
JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT).
"COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-103(9), -103(23.5), -103(28) (Supp. 1978); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 753
(McKinney Supp. 1978).
' 7D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 16-2301 (West Supp. 1978); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 720.10 (McKinney Supp. 1978). The Connecticut legislature has recently passed a bill requiring trials in
adult criminal courts for any juvenile, 14 or older, who is charged with murder or who is a
repeat felony offender. 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2661 (June 19, 1979). See also D. KATKIN. D.
HYMAN & J. KRAMER. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM, 95-100
(1976); Marina, Juvenile Crime-New York's Juvenile Criminals,A Call for Trial by Adult
Cour TRIAL, Feb. 1977, at 25.
"See IJA-ABA STANDARDS. SANCTIONS supranote 10. This volume has been withdrawn
and was not presented to the ABA House of Delegates. See Kabfman, Kaufman Claims
Win for JuvenileJustice, 65 A.B.A.J. 331 (1979).
"Note, Ungovernability: The Unjustifiable Jurisdiction,83 YALE L.J. 1383 (1974). See
generally Andrews & Cohen, PINS Processing in New York: An Evaluation, in BEYOND
CONTROL 45 (L. Teitelbaum & A. Gough eds. 1977); PURSUING JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD
(Rosenhein ed. 1976); E. RYERSON. THE BEST LAID PLANS (1978)(presents a discussion of
the reasons for our disillusionment).
2
TASK FORCE ON YOUTH CRIME. supra note 10; N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 712(A) (delinquent),
712(B) (person in need of supervision) (McKinney 1975). California did not create a label,
but formed three classes. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 600 (dependency), 601 (beyond control), 602 (delinquency) (West 1972).
2
'Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, tit. I, § 101, 88 Stat. 1109
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 5601 (1976)); TASK FORCE ON YOUTH CRIME. supranote 10.
See also HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY. JUVENILE JUSTICE AMENDMENTS OF 1977, H.R.
REP. No. 95-165, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); P. PARSLOE. JUVENILE JUSTICE IN BRITAIN
AND THE UNITED STATES 306 (1978); Feeney. The PINS Problem-A No-FaultApproach, in
BEYOND CONTROL 249 (1977).
22
See MODEL ACT: IJA-ABA STANDARDS. NON-CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR. supra note 10 (this
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The history of the legislative reform effort in Indiana nicely mirrors the
national debate and, once again, illustrates both the direct and indirect
effect of policy advocacy on the practical world of legislative compromise. A comparable history of the new Washington Juvenile Code has
23
been written by Washington State Representative Mary Kay Becker.
Since the final result in Washington sharply contrasts with Indiana's
final product, her excellent account of the pressures brought to bear on
the Washington Legislature should be compared with this account of
those same pressures in Indiana.
In the fall of 1967, in response to the June Gault decision, the Indiana.
Judicial Conference appointed a seventeen-person committee composed
exclusively of circuit and superior court judges who exercised juvenile
court jurisdiction.2 4 This committee, relying largely on the Third Tentative Draft of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act 5 and the organizational
structure of the 1945 Indiana Juvenile Code26 reported a proposed code to
the Conference in the fall of 1968. The Conference endorsed it with little
debate.
This code was largely concerned with providing a statutory base for
Gault's notice, confrontation, silence and counsel requirements and in
cleaning up and formalizing the procedures to be used in the juvenile
court. For example, the code was particularly concerned with
establishing a detention hearing, 27 although no distinction was made between crime-delinquent and status-delinquent children as to the basis for
the detention. Statements given by children to probation officers and at
the waiver hearing were made privileged. 28 The fact-finding and dispositional hearings were separated2 9 and dispositional alternatives were
restricted. 0 The juvenile court judge retained, however, his or her power

volume, as was the SANCTIONS volume, was withdrawn); BEYOND CONTROL (1977); NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY. STATUS OFFENDERS AND THE JUVENILE

JUSTICE SYSTEM (1978); Sussman, JudicialControlover NoncriminalBehavior,52 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1051 (1977).
2
Becker, Washington State's New Juvenile Code: An Introduction,14 GONZ. L. REV. 289
(1979). The Kansas Legislature also revised the Kansas Juvenile Code in 1978. An Act
Amending and Supplementing the Kansas Juvenile Code, ch. 158, 1978 Kan. Sess. Laws
684 (codified in scattered sections of KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-801 to -842 (Supp. 1979)). See
also Note, The Amended Kansas Juvenile Code: Can Parens Patria Withstand Due Process?, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 244 (1979). The results in Kansas appear closer to Indiana's
changes than do those in Washington.
2
Most of this history is not documented. The author served as reporter, consultant or
advisor to the committees or agencies involved.
"The UNIFORM ACT, as drafted, appeared in 1968.
"The 1945 Juvenile Code was codified in IND. CODE §§ 31-5-7-1 to -25 (1976) (repealed
1979).
"7The Proposed Code was introduced to the Indiana General Assembly, but was never
enacted. Ind. S.B. 15, 96th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (1969). The Proposed Code recommended
a detention hearing. Id. § 21.
28
Id. §§ 14, 22(c).
29
Id. §§ 24, 25.
"OSee id. § 25(d).
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attorney was not
to authorize the filing of the petition.3 1 The prosecuting
32
involved unless directed by the court to participate.
On the substantive side, the proposed code did reduce the number of
status offenses from seventeen under the 1945 Act 33 to four 34 but still
labelled the behavior delinquency. Jurisdiction over capital offense crime
3
was given to the juvenile court for the first time. 5
The only innovative policy recommendation, picked up from the
Uniform Act 36 and the 1962 New York Juvenile Code,37 was the proposal
to formally require a finding that the child needed treatment or rehabilitation before the child could be adjudged a delinquent child. In the Proposed Code, at the fact-finding hearing, the court could only determine
whether the child committed the delinquent act.3 8 Adjudication as a
delinquent child was to occur at the beginning of the dispositional
hearing, 39 after the finding of the need for treatment or rehabilitation.
Although not innovative, waiver to the adult court was limited to those
cases where "because the child is not amenable to treatment or
rehabilitation, the welfare of the community requires criminal pro' '40
ceedings.
Thus, the overall recommendation of the juvenile court committee
reflected a strong belief in procedural fairness for juveniles and a
41
strengthening of the parens patriae concept.
The Judicial Conference Proposed Code was subsequently introduced
31

ICL § 10.

USee id. § 23(f).
"The 1945 Juvenile Code was codified as IND. CODE §§ 31-5-7-1 to -25 (repealed 1979). The
status
offenses were found in § 4.
3
1The Proposed Code provided:
[W]ho is under the age of eighteen (18) years, and (A) who is disobedient and
ungovernable, refusing to accept the reasonable control of his parents, guardian, custodian or school authorities; or (B) who, being subject to compulsory
school attendance, is repeatedly absent from school without justification; or
(C) who is found on or about the streets of any city, or on or about any
highway or any public place between the hours of eleven (11) o'clock p.m. and
five (5) o'clock a.m. except returning home or to his place of abode after attending a religious or educational meeting or social function sponsored by a
church or school; or (D) who attempts or does wilfully'injure the morals of
another or the person or morals of himself.
Ind.S.B. 15, § 4(d)(2), 96th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (1969).
"Under the 1945 Code, children charged with crime punishable by death were prosecuted
directly in the adult court. IND. CODE § 31-5-7-4 (1976)(repealed 1979).
"UNIFORM ACT. supra note 10.
37N.Y. FAM. CT.AT §§ 711-784 (McKinney 1963)(amended version in McKinney (1975), at
the same sections).
38Ind. S.B. 15, § 24, 96th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (1969).
31& § 25. Hearsay contained in the social history report could be admitted into evidence
concerning the need for treatment or rehabilitation.
"Id. § 22.
"Clearly such provisions as putting capital offense back into the juvenile court, making
waiver available for only the child beyond rehabilitation and requiring a finding of need for
treatment and rehabilitation before the state intervenes in the life of the child, evidences
the juvenile court judges' commitment to the philosophical assumptions of the juvenile
court movement.
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in the 1969 session of the Indiana General Assembly. 42 It received
generally favorable responses in a joint Senate and House Judiciary
Committee hearing with almost no amendments being offered. But the
bill failed to pass. There was some rumbling that something had to be
done "to" the older, tougher child. A second-reading amendment in the
Senate was adopted which reduced the age of the juvenile court jurisdic43
tion from under eighteen to under sixteen.
Faced with the removal of sixteen and seventeen year old children from
their jurisdiction, leaders of the juvenile court judges committee persuaded the House Judiciary Committee to kill the bill.4 4 Both sides preferred the 1945 Act to the other's version of juvenile justice.
In 1970 the Civil Code Study Commission 45 agreed to sponsor a slightly
revised version of the Judicial Conference's 1969 Proposed Code. The
46
Commission submitted it to the 1971 session of the General Assembly.
The result was identical-the Senate lowered the age to sixteen and the
47
bill died in the House.

Having lost twice in the legislature, the proponents of the Proposed
Code discussed tactics with the Civil Code Study Commission. In the fall
of 1971 they decided to lift from their proposed code those sections
dealing with procedure and submit them to the Indiana Supreme Court
for adoption by rule. After considerable debate and discussion as to
which sections were "substantive" and which "procedural," a set of rules
was offered to the court in 1972. 48
The Indiana Supreme Court, then, in January of 1973 issued Rules of
Juvenile Procedure which were to take effect June 1, 1973. 49 Approximately one week after their issuance, the supreme court recalled them
stating that the court felt that additional hearings should be held on the
42
In addition to the substantive and procedural code which was introduced as Senate Bill
15, provisions concerning court structure and probation officers were introduced as Ind.
S.B. 16, 96th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (1969) and Ind. S.B. 17, 96th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(1969). Senate Bill 16 was enacted. An Act to Amend an Act Providing for Juvenile Courts
and Defining Their Powers and Jurisdiction, ch. 223, 1969 Ind. Acts 848.
4"INDIANA SENATE JOURNAL 606 (1969).
"There was no action taken on this bill by the House according to the INDIANA HOUSE

JOURNAL

(1969).

41The Commission is a state agency charged with general revision of law relating to
courts and court personnel. It has a large board composed of influential lawyers and
judges. It is currently named the Judicial Study Commission.
461nd. S.B. 112, 97th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (1971).
4'The amendment is noted at INDIANA SENATE JOURNAL 426-30 (Reg. Sess. 1971). The bill
was read for the first time in the House and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary on
March 3, 1971. INDIANA HOUSE JOURNAL 730-31 (Reg. Sess. 1971). It was never reported
out of that committee. I- at 2487.
41A copy of the Proposed Rules are on file with the clerk of the Indiana Supreme Court. A
bill almost identical to the Proposed Code that had been submitted to the 1971 Legislature
was independently introduced in the 1972 session. Ind. S.B. 92, 97th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg.
Sess. (1971). This bill passed the Senate, INDIANA SENATE JOURNAL 850 (2d Reg. Sess.
1971), but died in the House. INDIANA HOUSE JOURNAL 1163 (2d Reg. Sess. 1971).
0Order dated Jan. 9, 1973 is on file with the Clerk of the Indiana Supreme Court.
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content of the rules.5 0 The court directed its Rules Advisory Committee
to hold such hearings, which it did in May of 1973.
Subsequently, the Rules Advisory Committee submitted to the
supreme court, in the fall of 1973, a transcript of its hearings. The
supreme court, in the spring of 1974, then asked the Indiana Lawyer's
Commission to collate the testimony concerning the rules. They did so
and submitted the report in June of 1974. During the spring of 1974, the
Indiana Prosecuting Attorney's Council prepared and submitted to the
court an alternative set of proposed Rules of Juvenile Procedure. In the
fall of 1974, at the request of the supreme court, the Indiana Judicial
Center held statewide hearings on the proposed rules and submitted a
report of the hearings to the court in 1975.
The supreme court, apparently bothered by the ambiguity in what sections should be labeled procedure, and thus within its rulemaking power,
and also faced with several different sets of proposed rules, procrastinated.
The Legislature, however, in its 1975 session moved forward on two
fronts. A particularly horrendous robbery and rape in Indianapolis committed by a six foot fourteen year-old occasioned considerable publicity
concerning the complaint by the local juvenile court judge that he could
not waive the child to the adult court. 51 The Legislature responded by
enacting a curious mixture of conflicting policies reflecting, in large
measure, the conflicting policies emerging in the national debate over
juvenile justice.
For those who wanted a get-tough policy, using the fourteen year-old
rapist as an example, the Legislature lowered the waiver age to
fourteen,5 3 and, for serious crimes for those sixteen and over, made it
almost mandatory for the juvenile court to waive. 4 Juvenile courts were
also almost mandated5 5 to hold public hearings, for those children the
court did not waive, when the charge was a felony.5 6 The Legislature also
"The primary objection came from the Hoosier Press Association concerning certain sections of the rules which provided for increased secrecy in the juvenile court.
"Under the 1945 Code, the minimum age for waiver was 15. IND. CODE § 31-5-7-14
(1976)(repealed 1979).
"An Act to Amend IC 1971, 31-5 Concerning Juveniles and Repeals IC 1971, 31-5-4-1; IC
1971, 31-5-4-3; and IC 1971, 31-5-7-4, Pub. L. No. 296, 1975 Ind.Acts 1644 (codified in scattered sections of IND.CODE § 31-5)(repealed 1979) [hereinafter cited as Pub. L. No. 296, 1975
Ind. Acts].
"As introduced, this bill lowered the age of waiver to seven. Ind. S.B. 90, 99th Gen.
Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (1975).
' 4Pub. L. No. 296, § 6, 1975 Ind. Acts (amending IND. CODE 31-5-7-14 (1976)) (repealed
1979). For a discussion of this waiver provision and other sections of the 1975 Code, see
Hopson, Public Law 296: A Confused Step in the Wrong Direction, 1974-75 ANNUAL
SURVEY OF INDIANA LAW 227 (Ind.Continuing Legal Educ. F. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
Hopson].
"Pub. L. No. 296, § 7,1975 Ind. Acts (amending IND.CODE § 31-5-7-15 (1976)) (repealed
1979).

"The section provided: "The court shall consider that the best interest of the public
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appropriated funds and ordered5 7the Superintendent of the Indiana Boys'
School to build a security unit.

But the civil libertarians had their day also. The 1945 laundry list of
status offenses was reduced to three-incorrigibility, habitually truant
and a reworded curfew provision which because of poor drafting was incomprehensible and unenforceable. 58 Significantly, running away 59 and
under-age-eighteen consumption of alcohol 60 were omitted.
The 1975 Legislature also agreed with the reformers that the 1975
amendments were only the first of many legislative battles that it would
face over the next few years if it continued the practice of piecemeal
changes in the 1945 Act. Consequently, in Public Law 2, it created the
Juvenile Justice Division of the Judicial Study Commission. 6' The Division was to be broadly representative of juvenile justice professionals
62
and the juvenile justice system.
Responding to the criticism of the policies explicit in the 1975 amend63
ments and to the sloppy draftsmanship of many of these amendments,
the 1976 session of the General Assembly declined to wait for the report
of the Juvenile Justice Division 64 before acting. The Legislature once
again felt the pressure from the current debate, but this time, responded
by moving toward the older mainline view of the value of the juvenile
justice system. In Public Law 129, the Legislature, while retaining fourteen as the age for waiver, tightened the substantive requirements and
provided for a hearing for those being waived because of violent
behavior. 65 Also, any violation of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act
(possession of alcohol by minors) 6 6 was specifically made an act of statusdelinquency 67 and runaways were put back into the Juvenile Code,
although this time as an act of dependency.68 Moreover, responding to
welfare and the protection of public security generally is served by the public's abiiity to
gain
Id. at 1648-49.
5 knowledge....
7An Act to Amend IC 1971, 11-3-2 Concerning the Indiana Boys' School, Pub. L. No.
117, 1975 Ind. Acts 746 (codified as IND. CODE § 11-3-2-2.5 (1976)).
"See Hopson, supra note 54, at 231.
""Without just cause and without the consent of his parent, guardian, or other custodian, repeatedly deserts his home or his place of abode." IND. CODE'ANN. § 31-5-7-4(4)
(Burns 1973)(repealed 1975).
6""Unaccompanied by parent, patronizes or visits any room wherein there is a bar where
intoxicating liquors are sold," IND. CODE ANN. § 31-5-7-4(9) (Burns 1973)(repealed 1975) and
"uses intoxicating liquor as a beverage, or who uses opium, cocaine, morphine or other
similar drugs without the direction of a competent physician." IND. CODE ANN. §
31-5-7-4(14) (Burns 1973)(repealed 1975).
"An Act to Amend IC 1971, 2-5-8 Concerning the Indiana Judicial Study Commission,
Pub. L. No. 2, 1975 Ind. Acts 2 (amended 1978).
62Idj (codified as IND. CODE § 2-5-8-1.1 (1976)) (repealed 1978).
"See
Hopson, supranote 54, at 232.
64Final appointments to the Division did not occur, in any event, until April, 1976.
"An Act to Amend IC 31-5-7 and 35-1-92 Concerning Juveniles, Pub. L. No. 129, § 7,
1976 Ind. Acts 621 (codified as IND. CODE § 31-5-7-14 (1976)) (repealed 1979).
66IND. CODE § 7.1-5-7 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
"7Pub. L. No. 129, § 2, 1976 Ind. Acts (IND. CODE § 31-5-7-4.1) (repealed 1979).
"Id. § 3 (amending IND. CODE § 31-5-7-5(1976)) (repealed 1979).
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the deinstitutionalization movement, no dependent nor neglected child
could be placed in what we now would call a secure facility. 9 The push,
pull and cross-current continued.
In the fall of 1977 the Juvenile Justice Division reported its efforts to
the Legislature. Its bill 0 easily passed the 1978 session, but its effective
date was delayed until October 1, 197971 to allow for additional input
from the community 72 and to allow the Juvenile Justice Division to come
up with recommended improvements in the service delivery system.73
In response, the Division held hearings and submitted numerous, but
which, with one or two
mainly technical changes to the 19797 Legislature
4
exceptions, were also easily adopted.
Since the articles in this symposium detail the substantive and procedural provisions as finally adopted by the Legislature, even an outline
summary is unnecessary at this point. However, a few comments on the
national debate as reflected in the Division's work, which was substantially adopted by the Legislature, may be worthwhile.
The Division and the Indiana Legislature rejected the more strident
claims of both the fearmongers and the civil libertarians. 75 In fact, the
original parens patriae-individualized justice-service delivery philosophy
of the juvenile court movement was probably strengthened. But the influence of both the right and left were reflected in the new Code.
A subtle shift in philosophy appears in the purpose section.7 6 The first
purpose listed is: "to provide a juvenile justice system that protects the
public by enforcing the legal obligations children have to society" but the

third purpose still retains the basic juvenile justice system ideal. It
reads: "to insure that children within the juvenile justice system are
treated as persons in need of care, treatment, rehabilitation, or protec69Id. 6 (codified as IND. CODE § 31-5-7-12.2 (1976)) (repealed 1979); Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-415, § 223(a)(13), 88 Stat. 1109 (1974).
70Ind. H.B. 1028, 100th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (1978).
71
An Act to Amend IC 31, 11, 12, 16, 20, 33, 34 and 35 to Revise the Juvenile Law of the
Pub. L. No. 136, § 5B, 1978 Ind. Acts 1196.
State,
72
This technique was used by the Legislature when it adopted a new criminal code in
1976. An Act to Amend the Indiana Code to Revise the Criminal Law of the State, Pub. L.
No. 148 1976 Ind. Acts 718 (effective date delayed until July 1,1977). Comments from
legislators indicated that most were pleased with the technique and it allowed them to pass
a major reform effort without lengthy debate and detailed analyses. It also provided a way
to uncover technical mistakes or major changes that impinged too greatly on powerful interest groups. From the viewpoint of the "reformer" this system is also ideal. While it
delays the reform one year, it makes it much easier to get an original, lengthy act passed
with a minimum of gutting or inconsistent and irrational amendments. Most significantly,
once passed, the burden of persuading the legislature to amend then falls on those favoring
the status quo. See Horack, The Common Law of Legislation, 23 IOWA L. REV. 41 (1937).
"3See note 128 infra.

"'Ind. H.B. 2107, 101st Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (1979) (codified as scattered sections
of IND.

CODE

§

31-6).

"'Becker, supra note 23, at 305, reports that the ACLU and the police joined forces in
support of the Washington Code since the ACLU obtained removal of status offenses and
the
police obtained determinate punishment.
76
IND. CODE

§ 31-6-1-1 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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tion." Yet even the addition of the responsibility language does not, in
fact, move that far from the 1945 Act. It said: "The principle is hereby
recognized that children under the jurisdiction of the court are subject to
the discipline and entitled to the protection of the State, which may intervene to safeguard them from neglect or injury and to enforce the legal
obligations due to them and from them."" Surely the new Indiana purpose section is a far cry from the much heralded language of the new
Washington Code that:
It is the further intent of the Legislature that youth, in turn,
be held accountable for their offenses and both communities
and the juvenile courts carry out their functions consistent
with that intent. To effectuate these policies it shall be the purpose of this Chapter to:
(c) make the juvenile offender accountable for his or her
criminal behavior; (d) provide for punishment commensurate
with the age, crime, and criminal history of the juvenile of-

fender ....

78

Other efforts to criminalize the Indiana juvenile justice system were
partially successful. Easy waiver for serious felonies committed by
children, coming out of the 1975 amendment 79 to the 1945 Code, was retained 0° And as David Bahlmann and Stephen Johnson discuss in their
contribution to this symposium, At Long Last Credibility: The Role of
the Attorney for the State Under Indiana'sNew Juvenile Code, the prosecutor was given a significant decisionmaking role in the process. No
longer would the probation officer directly seek permission from the
court for authorization to file the petition as required in the 1945 Act s'
and the 1969 Judicial Conference Proposed Code. 82 Under the 1979 Code
the intake officer refers the preliminary inquiry to the prosecutor.83 He or
she then makes the decision whether to move forward on filing the petition. But even here the Division, reflecting a middle ground in the national argument, compromised. The prosecutor must seek authorization
from the court before filing the petition. While the judge's power to
"IND. CODE § 31-5-7-1 (1976) (repealed 1979).
"WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.010 (Supp. 1979).
"Pub. L. No. 296, 1975 Ind. Acts, supra note 52, at § 6 (codified as IND. CODE § 31-5-7-14)
(repealed 1979).
"But interestingly enough, murder, if a capital offense, which was excluded from
juvenile court jurisidiction under the 1945 Act, was made subject to the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the juvenile court as had been recommended in the 1969 Judicial Conference
Proposed Code, Senate Bill 15. This change occurred even though the 1978 Legislature, in
passing amendments to the criminal code, had expressly taken all murder prosecution
away form the juvenile court. An Act to Amend IC 1-1-1-8 Concerning the Severability of
Statutes, Pub. L. No. 2, § 3109, 1978 Ind. Acts 2d Reg. Sess. 1.
"IND. CODE § 31-5-7-8 (1976) (repealed 1979).
"Ind. S.B. 15, 96th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (1969).
"IND. CODE § 31-6-4-9 (Cum. Supp. 1979). For status offenses, the reference may be to the
attorney representing the county department of public welfare. Id. § 31-6-4-10.
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refuse to authorize the petition is not as unlimited as in the 1969 Judicial
Conference Proposed Code84 or as in the Division bill passed in 1978,5
ultimate practical power still resides with the court.86
Other shifts to a more prosecutive stance include a provision for a tenday jail sentence 87 and a retreat from the 1969 Judicial Conference Proposed Code that provided for confidentiality of statements made to probation officers,88 which is discussed in detail by Professor Batey, in
Transfer Between Courts Under the IndianaJuvenile Code, his exploration of the waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction.
Finally, one other change from the 1969 Judicial Conference Proposed
Code to the 1979 Act, as formally adopted, reflects the influence of the
criminalization of the juvenile court occasioned by the national debate.
As mentioned earlier, 9 the Judicial Conference bill, following the lead of
the Uniform Act, required a finding, before adjudication as a delinquent
child, of a need for treatment and rehabilitation. The finding was required
for both crime- and status-delinquent children. The new Code, after much

"Ind. S.B. 15, 96th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (1969).
"Pub. L. No. 136, 1978 Ind. Acts, supra note 71. For a discussion see note 87 infra.
"IND. CODE § 31-6-4-9 (Cum. Supp. 1979) provides:
The juvenile court shall consider the preliminary inquiry and the evidence of
probable cause. The court shall authorize the filing of the petition if it finds
probable cause to believe that the child is a delinquent child and that it is in
the best interests of the child or the public that the petition be filed.
Note that the required finding is probable cause "that the child is a delinquent child." For
status offenses, to make that finding, the court must find that "the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that he is not receiving, that he is unlikely to accept voluntarily and
that it is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the
court." See id. § 31-6-4-1.
Pub. L. No. 136, 1978 Ind. Acts, at § 21 required for a crime-delinquent child that the
court find probable cause "that the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation." Reflecting the increased popularity of criminalization within the Division after the original bill
passed, this language was dropped by the Division in its recommended amendments.
After eliminating the care and treatment language, the Division had required that the
court find before authorizing the filing of the petition that it "is in the best interest of the
child and the public that the petition be filed." The "or" was substituted prior to submission to the Legislature. Even under the final wording, however, a court would be free to
find that it was not in the best interest of the child or the public that a child who could be
handled informally through the probation office or diverted should be adjudicated a delinquent child.
"IND. CODE § 31-6-4-16(h) (Cum. Supp. 1979). This subsection restricts commitment "to
an area of the jail where he has no regular communication or contact with persons charged
with or convicted of crimes." The fight over this provision is instructive. Various drafts by
the Division and legislative amendment throughout the two legislative sessions included
jailing of 60 days, 30 days and deducting time spent in pre-trial detention. The final compromise was 10 days with no credit for pre-trial detention. Id- § 31-6-4-16(g)(5). But,
throughout the debate, no one suggested moving to Washington's proportionate determinate sentencing model. See IJA-ABA STANDARDS. supra note 10, SANCTIONS. All the participants conceived of "jail time" as rehabilitative shock therapy and as an alternative to a
commitment to the Indiana Boys' or Girls' Schools. Those opposed to jail time saw it as ineffective and probably even counterproductive.
"Ind. S.B. 15, § 14, 96th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (1969) (confidentiality of statements to
probation officers); id. § 22(c) (confidentiality of statements made during waiver hearings).
"See note 39 & accompanying text supra.
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debate within the Division, continues the requirement" for status offense
children but does not require any such finding for the crime-delinquent
child. One can argue that, since children in the system are "[to be] treated
as persons in need of care, treatment, rehabilitation or protection, "91the
Legislature has, as a matter of legislative policy, decreed that a child,
who commits an act which would be a crime if committed by an adult, is
conclusively presumed to be a person in need of treatment or rehabilitation. Nevertheless, the conceptual shift is evident.
Thus, the Division and the Indiana Legislature, while being influenced
by those on the national level who desired the criminalization of the
juvenile court for the crime-delinquent child, basically, unlike the
Washington Legislature, rejected that position. The concept of responsibility by the child for his or her behavior is now accepted by the Indiana
Legislature; but the concept is not that of criminal responsibility. It still
invokes only the coercive power of the state, under parens patriae, to
deliver treatment and rehabilitative services.
The civil libertarians of the children's liberation movement faired
about equally well with the Division and the Legislature. Their voice was
heard and the final product extensively reflects their views. However,
some of their key positions were rejected.
The complete abolition of status offense jurisdiction was considered by
the Division but the arguments in favor were found unpersuasive. The
Division was not convinced that voluntary service delivery would suffice
for the incorrigible, the runaway, and the truant and, in any event, the
Division felt that complete rejection of status offense jurisdiction would
never pass the Legislature. Moreover, the Division was not willing to
hide'coercive power over status offense children within a definition of
92
dependent or neglected children.
There was also an inarticulated premise, perhaps best illustrated by the
Division's retention of the label "delinquent" for status offense children
rather than creating PINS or CHINS, 93 that to remove status offenses
from the jurisdiction of the court would have an adverse effect on the
underlying premise that crime-delinquent children are not criminals subject to punishment. 94 If only crime-delinquent children were left within
"In fact it strengthens it. See note 109 & accompanying text infra.
""To insure that children within the juvenile justice system are treated as persons in
need of care, treatment, rehabilitation, or protection ...." IND. CODE § 31-6-1-1(3) (Cum.
Supp. 1979).
"See, e.g., MODEL AcT, supra note 10; Washington Juvenile Status Offense Laws, 2 U.
PUGENT SOUND L. REV. 170 (1978). Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34. 130 (1978) as amended by ch. 155, §§ 46 to 51, 1979 Wash. Legis. Serv.
"CHINS (in Indiana called Children in Need of Services, not Supervision) did become the
new label for dependent and neglected children. See IND. CODE § 31-6-4-3 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
94
In the United States at the present time, keeping PINS out of training
schools may be desirable as the most feasible short-term way of benefiting at
least one group of juveniles. As a long-term policy, emphasizing the distinction between delinquents and other juveniles appears to be short-sighted.
Delinquency itself is often a symptom of family problems. A far more
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the court, parens patriae for them becomes difficult to maintain.95 The
morality of this decision may be questioned, as Professor Teitelbaum
points out in this symposium, but only validly so if one believes that the
legislative labelling of certain behavior as criminal must be applied to
children.
Nevertheless, the impact of the national debate and the children's
liberation movement was substantial, particularly when contrasted to
what was considered a very pro-child 1969 Judicial Conference Proposed
Code. First, in the new Indiana Juvenile Code, as J. Richard Kiefer examines in this symposium, status offenses were limited to the carefully
and reasonably clearly defined behavior of running away, incorrigibility
and violation of the school truancy laws.96 The 1969 Judicial Conference
reasonable, but also considerably more difficult approach, would be to attempt to create facilities decent enough to treat or care for all or almost all
juveniles who cannot stay in their home for what ever reason, and to attempt
to minimize the stigma attached to any court adjudication.
LePoole, Law and Practice Concerning the Counterpartsof "PersonsIn Need of Supervision" in Some European Countries with ParticularEmphasis on the Netherlands, in
BEYOND CONTROL 115, 149 (1977).
"But see Zimring, Book Review (JuvenileJustice StandardsProject)91 HARv. L. REV.
1934 (1978). Francis McCarthy correctly argues that the IJA-ABA provision of removing
status offenses and in providing for proportionate punishment for crime leaves no real
function for the juvenile court. Thus, he recommends its abolition. See McCarthy, Delinquency Dispositions under the Juvenile JusticeStandards:The Consequences of a Change
of Rationale, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1093 (1977). Taking the same position is Wizner & Keller,
The Penal Model of Juvenile Justice: Is Juvenile Court Delinquency Jurisdiction
Obsolete?, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1120 (1977).

"The Code now reads:
A child commits a delinquent act if, before his eighteenth birthday, he:
(2) leaves home without reasonable cause and without permission of his
parent, guardian, or custodian who requests his return;
(3) violates the compulsory school attendance law (IC 20-8.1-3);
(4) habitually disobeys the reasonable and lawful commands of his parent,
guardian, or custodian; or
(5) commits a curfew violation.
IND. CODE § 31-6-4-1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
A curfew violation is defined as:
(a) it is a curfew violation for a child thirteen (13), fourteen (14), fifteen (15),
sixteen (16), or seventeen (17) years of age to be in a public place:
(1) between 1 a.m. and 5 a.m. on Saturday or Sunday;
(2) after 11 p.m. on Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday; or
(3) before 5 a.m. on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, or Friday.
(b) it is a curfew violation for a child under thirteen (13) years of age to be
in a public place after 10 p.m. or before 5 a.m. on any day.
(c) This section does not apply to a child who is:
(1) accompanied by his parent, guardian, or custodian;
(2) accompanied by an adult specified by his parents, guardian, or custodian, or
(3) participating in or returning from lawful employment or a lawful
athletic, educational, entertainment, religious or social event.
IND. CODE § 31-6-4-2 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The 1976 version of curfew was retained on
political grounds. Its wording renders it largely symbolic since it probably is unenforceable. Note particularly subsection (c)(3).
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Proposed Code's status definition, which included "who attempts or does
willfully injure the morals of another or the person or morals of
himself," 97 was eliminated. Also eliminated was the 1976 legislative
restoration of underage possession of alcohol98 as a status offense. 99
Secondly, and more importantly, the Division and the Legislature rejected the 1969 Judicial Conference Proposed Code that allowed equal
placement for status- and crime-delinquent children by providing in the
new Code that there could be no secured detention 00 or post-adjudication
secure placement'0 ' for incorrigibles, or truants. Only forty-eight hours
(which includes Saturdays,
Sundays and holidays) secure detention for
02
runaways is permitted.

While the Bayh bill 0 3 which threatened loss of federal juvenile delinquency money if the state holds status offense children in secure detention, 10 4 played a role in the ultimate decision to deinstitutionalize status
offense children, it surely was not determinative. The basic argument
that secure placement of status offense children is counterproductive to
rehabilitation and is not needed for the protection of the community (felt
by the Division to be the only legitimate role of the juvenile justice
system) was agreed to by the Division. If secure detention serves no function, it should be abolished. While the Division recommended no secure
detention, even for runaways, the Legislature's forty-eight hour secure
detention policy is not inconsistent with the basic policy of the
Legislature to respond favorably to the civil libertarian argument that in"'Ind. S.B. 15, § 4(d)(2)(D), 96th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (1969).
'SIND. CODE § 31-5-7-4.1(a)(6) (Supp. 1978)(repealed 1979), had defined a delinquent child
as one who "commits an act which, if committed by a person at least eighteen (18) years of
age but less than twenty-one (21) years of age would be an offense under IC 7.1-5-7." Id.
"Presumably a child who was an alcoholic could be found to be a CHINS under IND.
CODE § 31-6-4-3(a)(6) (Cum. Supp. 1979), if he substantially endangers his own health or the
health of another.
"-I& § 31-6-5-6.5.
-'Icl § 31-6-4-16.
"2Id. § 31-6-4-6.5. A child who is alleged to be a delinquent child because of an act under §
31-6-4-1(a)(2) (runaways) may be held in secure detention for 48 hours. Subsection (c) was a
legislative goof. The Division recommended no secure detention for any status offense
children. The House amended the Division recommendation to allow for 48 hours (plus
Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays) secure detention for runaway children. The Senate
voted in favor of a 24 hour (plus Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays) secure detention.
The Conference Committee agreed to a 24 hour limitation and counted in Saturdays, Sundays and holidays as part of the 24 hours. The House staff attorney in executing the Conference Committee report redrafted the language so as to exclude the exception for Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, but left the 48 hours in the bill as printed. Although both the
House and Senate, when voting on the Conference Report, thought they were reducing
secure detention to 24 hours, they discovered, after the bill was formally printed, that they
had actually voted in favor of 48 hours.
1"'Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, tit. I, § 223(a)(13), 88 Stat.
1109.
104The regulations issued by LEAA, Office of Juvenile Delinquency, 43 Fed. Reg. 36402
(1978), allows 24 hours secure detention. As mentioned above, the legislative intent was to
allow only 24 hours secure detention thus complying with the regulation. Hopefully the
1980 session of the Indiana Legislature will be able to bring Indiana into compliance.
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stitutionalization is counterproductive for children. An argument can be
made that short term secure detention is needed to find parents or guardians. 0
Third, the Division and the Legislature moved one step beyond the
1969 Judicial Conference Proposed Code's mandated finding of a need for
treatment or rehabilitation. The new Code requires that the court find
that the child, if a status offense child: "needs care, treatment or
rehabilitation that he is not receiving, and that he is unlikely to accept
voluntarily, and that is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the
coercive intervention of the court."'' 06 While this requirement does not
create the truly "voluntary" seeking of services by the child and his family (there is the ultimate threat of coercive intervention by the court),
recommended by the IJA-ABA Standards Project and others, 10 7 it was
clearly a legislative declaration of policy that voluntary services were
preferred. In practice, the courts will have to inquire whether the child
has rejected voluntary efforts before adjudicating him or her a delinquent
child. In rejecting the more radical removal of jurisdiction, the Division
wanted to avoid the specter of private secure placement by parents in
"educational" institutions,0 8 and to reassure the community that "help"
was available from the court. Actually the new Indiana Juvenile Code
gives but little more, if any, ultimate power to the juvenile court than
does the Washington status offense statute. 0 9
Fourth, by allowing the court to easily acquire jurisdiction over the
parents or guardians of the child (including crime-delinquent children as
well as status-delinquent children and CHINS)," 0 the Legislature took a
major step in recognizing that not only status offense children, but also
crime-delinquent children are in a no-fault situation vis-a-vis their
parents, a position strongly advocated (as to status offense children) by
the National Task Force on Juvenile Justice of the Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention."'
Other provisions also go far in protecting the child against oppressive
or negligent official action. For example, many have advocated closer
supervision of foster care placement of dependent and neglected

"'5In fact, even Washington allows the 48 hours detention. See Note, Washington's

Runaway Youth Act and Juvenile Court Procedure for Families in Conflict: A Brief Examination, 14 GONZ. L. REV. 439, 451 (1979).
"°6IND. CODE § 31-6-4-1(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1979) (emphasis added).
"'See note 10 & accompanying text supra.
"'8See Vonier, JuvenileJustice "HottestIssue" Goingin Nation, Reno Evening Gazette,
July 18, 1978, at 20, col. 1.
"'See Washington Juvenile Status Offense Laws, 2 U. PUGENT SOUND L. REV. 170, 190
(1978), for a discussion of the 30 day diagnostic secure detention allowed by the
Washington Code.
"°IND. CODE § 31-6-4-17 (Cum. Supp. 1979).

"'THE

TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION. NATIONAL AD-

VISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS. JUVENILE JUSTICE AND

DELINQUENCY PREVENTION 317 (1976)(Standard 10.2, Allegations Contained in the
Families with Service Needs Petition).
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children." 2 Indiana's new nine and eighteen month review for all CHINS,
status offense and crime-delinquent children'1 3 goes beyond the usual
recommendation to protect the neglected child. Status offense and crimedelinquent children should not be lost either.
Thus, the Indiana Legislature's new Juvenile Code was in the best
American tradition - responding to passionately held beliefs that promised a solution for a major social problem, but rejecting the all or nothing
solution advocated by the true believer. Other states were not as for4
tunate."1

The articles presented in this symposium will give the reader the opportunity to assess, in detail, how well the Division and the Legislature carried out its policy of staying with parens patriae and procedural due process. The article by Lee Teitelbaum, Jurisdiction Over Misbehaving
Children and Their Parents Under the New IndianaJuvenile Law, well illustrates the weakness of the Indiana compromise position, and it will
force the reader to critically evaluate whether the historic goal of the
juvenile court is, indeed, possible, or even desirable, in 1979.
Likewise, the article by Robert Batey, TransferBetween Courts Under
the IndianaJuvenile Code, examines the weakness of the Indiana waiver
provision" 5 as measured against the IJA-ABA Standards"' and shows,
in detail, how the use of pre-transfer confessions in the subsequent
criminal prosecution compromises the goal of care and rehabilitation in
the juvenile justice system." 7
The two articles by Indiana lawyers, Division members, David
Bahlmann and Stephen Johnson, At Long Last Credibility:The Role of
the Attorney for the State Under Indiana'sNew Juvenile Code, and J.
Richard Kiefer, This Code is Rated "R" - Second Class Citizenship
Under Indiana's New Juvenile Code, and one by an Indiana Juvenile
Court Judge, a Division member, J. Brandon Griffis, A Judicial
Response to the New Juvenile Code, provide a constructive counterbalance to the articles by the academic outsiders.

"'Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 226 (1975); Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of
"Neglected" Children: Standardsfor Removal of Children from their Homes, Monitoring
the Status of Children in FosterCare, and Terminationof ParentalRights, 28 STAN. L. REV.
623 (1976).
"IND. CODE § 31-6-4-19 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
" 4 N.Y. JUD. LAW §§ 711 to 784 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1978); WASH. REV. CODE tit. 13
(Supp.1979).
"SIND. CODE § 31-6-2-4 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
16 IJA-ABA STANDARDS, supra note 10, TRANSFER BETWEEN COURTS.
"'Although the Standards Project protects statements made at the transfer hearing
itself, id.§ 2.31 commentary, the standards themselves make no mention of the use of confessions at a later criminal trial. The 1969 Judicial Conference Proposed Code did contain
provisions protecting confessions made to a probation officer or during the waiver hearing
from later use in a criminal court. See Ind. S.B. 15, §§ 14, 22, 96th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(1969).
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Judge Griffis explains some of the processes within the Division itself
and points out the major impact of the Indiana Council of Juvenile and
Family Court Judges on the final product. The article itself shows the
frustration of an experienced and competent juvenile court judge with
the extremes of the right and the left. Buying the parens patriae concept,
he analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the new act in terms of the
responsibility of a juvenile court judge to use the power of the state to
provide care, treatment and rehabilitation to Indiana's troubled children.
Finally, he notes the lack of legislative responsibility in funding the services mandated by the Code.
The Bahlmann and Johnson and the Kiefer articles, in contrast,
analyze the new Code in terms of its weaknesses (and strengths) from the
prosecutorial (Bahlmann) and defense counsel (Kiefer) perspectives. Both
concentrate on the procedural provisions contained in the Code and the
role of the prosecutor or defense counsel. For attorneys wanting a survey
of the new Code in its entirety and help in effectively representing the
state or the child, both articles will be invaluable.
One final point should be made. Like Judge Griffis, I too believe that
the state has abdicated its responsibility to Indiana children by its
failure to address the issue of service delivery. Whatever new model is
adopted by a state-junior criminal court, removal of jurisdiction over
status offenses, or due process parens patriae-the state must ensure
that it has not built in failure of the new system by underfunding. The
State of Washington is a good example. With its heralded new model of
juvenile justice, it was saved by a $3,635,000 grant from LEAA."8
Indiana's failure, and perhaps the failure of other states, goes deeper
than a mere inadequate funding of services. Service delivery has, since
the advent of the juvenile justice system, been a hodgepodge of service
delivery systems. Funds come from county, state and national government sources, supplemented by United Way and other charitable giving.
Responsibility for service has been split between the court and, in most
states, several executive branch agencies. 119
The results, not surprisingly, have been poor. There is too much truth
in the claim by the left and the right that the system does not deliver care
and treatment. As long as the system remains fragmented with each
agency (including the courts) being able to shift responsibility for lack of
service, the situation will not greatly improve.
The Indiana Juvenile Justice Division must bear responsibility for not
being able to come to grips with the problem. In its report to the 1979
Legislature,' 0 which contained amendments to the 1978 Act, the Divi"'Becker, supra note 23, at 310.
"'For an excellent review of the service delivery system in the juvenile justice area, see
Harmon, UnravellingAdministrative Organizationsof State Juvenile Services, 13 CRIME
& DELINQUENCY 432 (1967).
'PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE INDIANA JUVENILE CODE

Proposal, Dec., 1978).

(P.L. 136) (Delivery of Services

INDIANA LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 54:519

sion also recommended appropriation of four million dollars for juvenile
court probation officer salary subsidy (with upgrading of probation officer qualification), appropriation of sixteen million dollars for one-half
the county cost for per diem care for children placed by the courts and the
creation of a state wide juvenile coordination board and office. None of
these recommendations passed the Legislature.
In disenting from these proposals I wrote:
When the Juvenile Justice Division was unable to recommend
any improvements in the way Indiana delivered services to
troubled children, the General Assembly, in addition to
passing a new Juvenile Code, continued the life of the Division
and ordered it to take a good look at our delivery system. The
Division did so.
However, the recommendations, contained in this document
(pages 88-92), of the Juvenile Justice Division concerning the
delivery of services are inadequate. While I favor, as a general
proposition, partial state funding of per diem charges for
children placed by the Juvenile Court and partial state funding
of Juvenile Court Probation Services, the proposal to create
the Indiana Board and Office for the Coordination of Children
and Youth Services is woefully inadequate. At best, this new
office is merely the reincarnation of the Indiana Youth Council, a state agency established in the mid-1960's and effectively
abolished in 1977 when the Legislature declined to fund it for
more than two dollars. Our children deserve better than the
proposals contained herein.
Why did the Legislature abolish the Youth Council? What
could be substituted for it that would have at least a chance of
effectively and efficiently delivering the services,
psychological, social work, habilitation, and correctional, that
the troubled children of this state need if they are to become
productive adults rather than inmates of our prisons or
habitues of our welfare rolls?
The Youth Council was abolished because it, in fact, was
merely window dressing. It was to coordinate and promote service delivery but had neither the power nor independent funds,
nor even any mandate, to organize the existing fragmented
delivery system. Failure was built into its structure.
What is needed? The subcommittee [of the Division which had
drafted a comprehensive delivery system] recognized that
there were many dedicated service delivery people working
hard and frequently effectively within the existing delivery
system. But they were hampered by the bureaucratic structure
now in existence. Consequently, the subcommittee proposed,
after a year of work, in August, 1977, a draft of a bill that
would have established, on the state level, a Department of
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Children and Youth Services, and, on the county level, a County Department of Children and Youth Services. This proposal,
although receiving a majority of votes, was not, under the
rules of the Division, presented to the Legislature. In 1978,
these proposals were rejected by a majority of the Division.
Space limitations prevent a detailed analysis of these proposals. The basic thrust of the bill was to transfer from the
Department of Correction, the juvenile delinquency programs
and facilities (the Boys' and Girls' Schools); from the State
Department of Public Welfare, the Division of Child Welfare
Services (but not the AFDC program); and from the Department of Mental Health, the Division of Child Mental Health.
These major child serving programs would be moved into the
Department of Children and Youth Services. These transfers
would solve four current problems:
1. The fragmented gaps and overlaps of service delivery
caused by bureaucratic structures which were based on the
type of service - corrections, mental health, etc., rather
than the needs of the client - the child;
2. The low priority children's services received in each
department since the department was also responsible for
adult services;
3. The lack of one agency that could be held responsible for
the inadequate level of services; and
4. The lack of one agency given the responsibility of presenting to the Legislature the needs of Indiana children
and a plan to meet those needs.
The subcommittee's proposals would not have created a new
level of bureaucracy nor a super agency. It merely provided for
a reorganization and consolidation of services in a manner that
solved the existing problems. This structure would have been,
in fact, more cost-effective in that duplication and gaps in services could have been eliminated. In truth, the only additional
cost would have been the salary of the chief administrator and
a secretary or two. Administrative consolidation would more
than have offset that cost.
Likewise, the same types of problems exist on the county level.
Services are fragmented. County councils are bombarded with
requests for funds for services either directly or as a match for
LEAA of Title XX funding. Planning and coordination are
generally lacking. Evaluation of existing programs is difficult.
Waste is probably high. A County Department, as both a coordinator and deliverer of services, could solve many of these
problems. Again, the cost of the consolidation into the county
department would be low. Existing personnel now split among
several county agencies would be consolidated (i.e., the child
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welfare workers in the County Department of Public Welfare
would be moved to the County Department of Children and
Youth Services).
The subcommittee's bill was in fact a modest beginning in providing a mechanism for assessing the needs of children and for
providing these programs that would help meet those needs. It
did not change the power relationship between state and local
government, nor did it call for massive new programs. In
essence, it said that the people of Indiana are entitled to a
governmental structure at both the state and local level that
has a real chance of giving children the high priority among
competing governmental activities - the priority that our
children and society deserve.
Even if the Indiana General Assembly declined to create either
the State or County Departments (while desirable, both need
not be created at the same time), they should have had an opportunity to consider a comprehensive solution to our problems. The proposed State and County Departments are one
such solution.
It would have been possible to have solved some of these problems by the creation of a strong Board and Office for the Coordination of Children and Youth Services. The Division, in the
proposal presented in this document, did not do so. Almost
every effort to strengthen the Office was defeated on a split
vote. All efforts to create, on the county level, some form of
coordination were also defeated. All that is left and all that is
presented is a shell - the same shell that proved worthless
12 1
when called the Indiana Youth Council.
Washington and Indiana have both adopted a comprehensive restructuring of their juvenile justice systems. Washington bought, in large
measure, the radical IJA-ABA model; Indiana rejected it, electing to
stay with due process parens patriae. Neither state adequately addressed
the problem of service delivery within the system.
In the future there will be, one hopes, major studies of how well each
system has worked. At that time, decisionmakers will be able to arrive at
a much better judgment as to which system most helps the growth and
development of our children.

"'This dissent was included in the

PROPOSED AMENDMENT. Id

